In 2013 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €5 banknote.
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Non-technical summary
This paper studies the role of adverse selection in competition among stock exchanges when price priority across markets is not enforced, i.e. the regulator does not explicitly prohibit trades to execute at prices that are inferior to the best available price across all relevant trading platforms. The analysis is motivated by the absence of a so-called "trade-through rule" under MiFID in the European Union, which stands in contrast to the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) in the United States that protects the currently best quote by forcing exchanges to route incoming orders to other markets in case they offer better terms of trade.
First, we present a two-market version of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) sequential trade model, where one market (the "Primary Market") can be accessed by all agents while trading in the other market (the "Entrant Market") requires agents to have access to a multi-market trading technology. This is motivated by the fact that searching for the best price among multiple venues is costly and computer technology helps to facilitate this process. Additionally we assume that the Primary Market charges higher transaction fees, which is motivated by the lower transaction fees observed on newly created trading platforms across Europe post-MiFID. We show that under the absence of a trade-through prohibition, this market access friction gives rise to differences in the adverse selection risk faced by liquidity providers. If informed traders are more likely than uninformed traders to be "smart routers", situations can arise where the Primary Market displays the best quote frequently (i.e. he offers better terms of trade) despite charging higher transaction fees. In general, the Entrant Market's competitiveness in negatively related to the excess adverse selection due to market access frictions.
We next turn to an empirical analysis of multi-market trading in the post MiFID environment by analysing a sample of transactions and quote data for German and French stocks listed on their respective home markets (Deutsche Börse and Euronext) and on Chi-X, the first multilateral trading facility (MTF) launched in the context of pan-European equity trading. Our estimates confirm the existence of imperfections in traders' routing abilities as only about every second trade originates from agents with perfect access to the Entrant Market. Moreover, trades on this new trading platform carry significantly more private information than their counterparts on the Primary
Introduction
The introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in late 2007 has spawned competition among stock exchanges across Europe. Under the new legislation, alternative trading platforms (so-called Multilateral Trading Facilities, henceforth MTFs) may directly compete with the national stock exchanges (Primary Markets) for customer order flow. Ultimately, MiFID aims at creating a level playing field that promotes competition between market centers and fosters innovation.
One issue that has received a great deal of attention in the context of inter-market competition is the design of best execution policies. Under MiFID, intermediaries such as banks and brokers bear the entire responsibility for obtaining "the best possible result" for their clients' orders. Importantly, best execution is not only based on prices but rather permits the consideration of a wide array of additional execution characteristics such as liquidity, order size, and the likelihood of execution, among others (see e.g. Petrella [2009] and Gomber and Gsell [2010] for details).
Consequently, MiFID does not formally enforce inter-market price priority and orders are permitted to execute at a price that is inferior to the best available price across venues ("trade-throughs"). This differs considerably from the rules that are in place in the United States under Reg NMS, which mandates exchanges to re-route orders to other market centers if those are offering a better price ("trade-through rule").
In this article, we argue that allowing for trade-throughs may benefit the Primary Markets and therefore limit inter-market competition. To this end, we study how market access frictions give rise to differences in adverse selection risks across trading venues in the absence of inter-market price priority. Inspired by the current market setting in Europe, we develop an extension of the Glosten and Milgrom [1985] sequential trade model where liquidity providers post quotes in two separate trading platforms, the Primary Market and a low-cost MTF. A key ingredient in our model is the existence of market access frictions. Following Foucault and Menkveld [2008] , we assume that the Primary Market is accessible by all agents in the economy, while trading on the MTF requires a so-called smart order routing system that is only available to a subset of the trader population. Due to the absence of a trade-through rule, this access friction gives rise to inter-market differences in the adverse selection risk faced by liquidity providers. If informed traders are more likely than uninformed traders to be "smart routers", situations can arise where the Primary Market offers better quotes frequently despite charging higher transaction fees.
The analysis of a recent sample of transactions and quote data for German and French stocks confirms the existence of imperfections in traders' routing abilities, as only about every second trade originates from agents with perfect access to Chi-X, a recently launched MTF. Moreover, we find that trades executed on this new trading platform carry significantly more private information than their counterparts on the Primary Markets, while trade-throughs are particularly uninformative. This implies that liquidity providers on the MTF incur a higher adverse selection risk precisely because an important fraction of the uninformed order flow is held captive in the Primary Markets. Cross-sectional regressions provide empirical support for our theory, as we find that this excess adverse selection risk is negatively related to Chi-X's presence at the inside quote.
These results have important implications for the design of best executions policies.
Allowing for trade-throughs benefits the Primary Markets because captive traders constitute a stable customer basis that is not subject to competition from other exchanges. Additionally, liquidity providers on alternative trading venues are exposed to a higher adverse selection risk because smart routers are more likely to be informed than the average trader. This excess risk frequently results in poor quotes and therefore diverts additional order flow from smart routers to the Primary Markets.
Therefore, trade-throughs constitute an important obstacle for inter-market competition as the cheaper market (in terms of transaction fees) may end up with very little order flow, even from agents that have access to it. In this sense, our model supports the idea that the enforcement of inter-market price priority may foster competition between exchanges.
Our findings are in line with existing concerns about MiFID's best execution policy.
In the absence of inter-market linkages, market fragmentation increases the costs for monitoring markets in real-time, as it requires intermediaries to adopt a smart order routing system. For smaller market participants, the substantial costs associated with such an infrastructure may well exceed the expected benefits. Conversations with market participants and some anecdotal evidence support these concerns, as for example retail order flow appears to be routed exclusively to the Primary Markets 1 . Ende and Lutat [2010] document a sizeable fraction of trade-throughs in European stocks, which confirms the existence of market access imperfections post-MiFID.
Finally, our story of increased adverse selection is also consistent with the low trading volumes seen on MTFs during several primary market outages 2 . This paper contributes to the existing literature on inter-market competition. While early theoretical papers (e.g. Pagano [1989] and Chowdry and Nanda [1991] ) argue that markets display a natural tendency to consolidate as a consequence of liquidity externalities, there is a large empirical literature that empirically documents the existence of fragmented financial markets (e.g. Bessembinder [2003] , Boehmer and Boehmer [2004] , Goldstein et al. [2007] , Biais et al. [2010] ).
Most closely related to our paper, Foucault and Menkveld [2008] develop and test a theory of competition between two markets in an environment that allows for tradethroughs. In their model, which abstracts from uncertainty about the asset's fundamental value, risk-neutral competitive agents trade off the expected revenue from liquidity provision against order submission fees. They find that the share of liquidity provided on the alternative trading platform (weakly) increases in the proportion of smart routers. While our work shares their assumption of heterogeneity in traders' routing abilities, we consider a model with a risky asset and asymmetric information. We therefore contribute to the literature by studying the role of market access frictions (together with the absence of a trade-through rule) for inter-market competition through differences in informed trading. Naturally, our work is also closely related to a number of papers that study differences in informed trading across markets. One strand of this literature analyzes the effects of "cream-skimming" and payment for order flow (e.g. Easley et al. [1996] , Bessembinder and Kaufman [1997] , Battalio et al. [1997] , Parlour and Rajan [2003] ).
In our context, the competitiveness of alternative trading platforms is hampered by the concentration of uninformed order flow on the Primary Markets due to trade-throughs generated by captive traders. This contrasts strongly with the standard paradigm within this literature, where uninformed order flow is directed away from the main market center due to so-called preferencing agreements 3 . Other papers (e.g. Grammig et al. [2001] , Barclay et al. [2003] , Goldstein et al. [2007] ) document differences in informed trading between dealer markets and anonymous electronic trading systems.
Generally, these studies find order flow in electronic markets to be more informative, presumably because informed traders value the higher speed of execution offered by these venues and try to prevent information leakage due to interacting with intermediaries such as market makers. In contrast, we show that differences in informed trading across exchanges may also arise through the absence of inter-market price priority paired with frictions in traders' market access. Finally, our model also accommodates the results of Hengelbrock and Theissen [2009] , who study the market entry of the Turquoise MTF in late 2008 and find that the trading activity in larger and less volatile stocks tends to fragment more. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical model, while Section 3 describes the institutional environment and presents the data. Section 4 presents estimates for differences in informed trading between the Primary Markets and Chi-X, and Section 5 presents evidence on the model's empirical implication.
Section 6 concludes, while proofs and tables are relegated to the appendix.
The Model
There is a single risky asset with liquidation value V  V,V   , where we set Pr(V  V )   0  1/2 for simplicity. The asset can be traded on two separate trading platforms, which we denote by C(hi-X) and P(rimary Market). These markets are populated by N P  2 and N C  2 identical, risk neutral market makers, respectively, who post bid and ask quotes for a single unit of the risky asset. Market P charges a cost c > 0 per trade to market makers, while the cost charged by market C is normalized to zero. We assume that c is very small in comparison to the asset's fundamental uncertainty, i.e. c  (V  V ) /2.
There is a continuum of traders, who arrive sequentially at time points t=1, …, T.
Unlike Dennert [1993] , we assume that each trader may buy or sell at most one unit of the asset. Moreover, agents may only trade once, directly upon entering the market. A proportion  of the trader population is perfectly informed about the liquidation value V, while the remaining traders are uninformed. Whereas all agents can trade in market P, trading in market C requires a smart order routing system that is not available to all agents in the economy. Denote the proportion of informed and uninformed traders with smart order routing technology by  I and  U , respectively. We call those traders smart routers, while agents that can only trade in market P are named captive traders. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Uninformed traders buy or sell with equal probability. Informed traders buy if V  V and the best ask at which they can trade is less or equal to V at the time of their arrival, and sell if V  V and the best available bid is higher or equal to V . Otherwise, they do not trade. Traders always choose to trade in the market that offers the better price given their trading interest and market access.
One issue arises in situations where both venues display identical quotes, such that smart routers are indifferent between markets. Given that market makers are not required to place their quotes on a discrete grid (i.e. the tick size is zero), such ties may arise even if both trading platforms charge different fees for market orders, because ultimately all fees are borne by the market order traders (liquidity providers simply pass them on). Clearly, a positive tick size can break traders' indifference, as ties will only occur before transaction costs. Then, smart routers will rationally trade in the market that demands lower fees for market orders. As the introduction of a tick size comes at the expense of additional notation without providing further insights, we opt for a reduced-form approach and assume that smart routers always trade in market C in the case of an inter-market tie.
Assumption (Tie-breaking rule):
In the case of an inter-market tie, smart routers always trade in market C.
On the other hand, if several market makers post the same price in the same market, we assume that one of them is randomly selected (with equal probability) as a trading partner for the incoming trader. After each trading round t, market makers update their beliefs about the probability of the high outcome of the asset's liquidation value using Bayes' rule and revise their quotes accordingly. We assume that they observe each other's trades 4 , which implies that they hold identical beliefs about the liquidation value at all times. Let  t1 denote this common belief prior to the arrival of the t-th trader.
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the bid side. Results for the ask side can be 
Given that captive traders can only trade in the Primary Market, the probability of a sell occurring in market P is always strictly positive. On the other hand, trade may only occur in market C if the bid quote at least matches the bid prevailing in market P.
This leads us to the following definition of market co-existence.
Definition (Market co-existence):
Markets co-exist iff We are now ready to state our main result, which provides a condition for market coexistence to obtain in equilibrium. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in pure strategies.
Proposition 1:
Let N P . Then, in equilibrium, markets co-exist if and only if
where
See Appendix A.
To understand the intuition behind this result, first consider the case where
This implies that  SR   , i.e. the proportion of informed traders among smart routers is no greater than the proportion of informed traders in the overall trader population, such that market makers on platform C face a (weakly) lower adverse risk.
Additionally, market C does not charge any transaction fees, so that the best bid on Chi-X is always strictly higher than the best bid in the Primary Market. In this case,
condition (1) Proposition 1 has an empirical implication for Chi-X's quote competitiveness in the cross-section. In order to see this, define AS  max  t 1 AS( t1 ) , where
. Now consider two assets, A and B, and suppose
for all market maker beliefs  t1 , i.e. the cross-market adverse selection differential (Chi-X minus Primary Market) is always strictly greater for asset A. If c  AS A , the market co-existence condition (1) is satisfied for all possible beliefs and the best bid on Chi-X will match or improve upon the best bid in the Primary Market throughout the entire trading day for both assets. On the other hand, condition (1) is not always satisfied if c  AS A . Moreover, as
, there exist beliefs for which Chi-X matches or improves on the Primary Market for asset B, while the Primary Market displays a strictly better quote for asset A. The converse never holds. This leads us to the following empirical prediction.
Corollary 1:
In the cross-section, Chi-X's presence at the inside quote (weakly) decreases in the adverse selection risk differential (Chi-X minus Primary Market).
Institutional details and data
In the remainder of the paper, we empirically analyze a sample of transaction data from Chi-X and two Primary Markets, Euronext (Paris) and Xetra (Frankfurt), in order to validate the empirical prediction of our model (Corollary 1). Before we turn to the description and a preliminary analysis of our dataset, we provide a brief overview of the institutional details that pertain to our sample period (May -April 2008).
Institutional details
Chi-X was launched on March 30th, 2007, when it started to offer trading in German and Dutch blue chips. Later the same year, trading was extended to the largest British Like virtually all European stock markets, Chi-X is organized as a continuous, fully electronic limit order market (LOM). During trading hours, participants can continuously submit, revise and cancel limit and market orders. Non-executed limit orders are stored in the limit order book, and incoming market orders execute against those. Trading is fully anonymous, both pre-and post-trade.
Chi-X offers a very simple fee structure, which is asymmetric (a so-called make/take fee scheme): Passive executions (limit orders) receive a rebate of 0.2 bps, while aggressive executions (market orders) are charged 0.3 bps. Therefore, the platforms overall revenue per trade amounts to 0.1 bps. In the US market, these make/take fee schemes have proven key to success for the ECNs.
As opposed to Chi-X, the Primary Markets under consideration in this paper Table 2 Besides charging considerably lower fees, Chi-X distinguishes itself from the Primary Markets in several other aspects. Most prominently, the MTF specifically targets high frequency traders via an ultra-low system latency, which according to the platform 7 is "up to ten times faster than the fastest European primary exchange". Moreover, Chi-X offers a wider range of admissible order types such as hidden and pegged orders.
While the first order type is completely invisible until executed 8 , the latter type is a limit order where the limit price is "pegged" to a reference price, e.g. the best bid in the Primary Market, and is updated continuously. Finally, at the time of our sample While Chi-X only offers trading in a continuous LOM, both Xetra and Euronext additionally hold call auctions to set the opening and closing prices. Xetra also has an intraday call auction at 13:00 CET, which nevertheless generates only negligible trading volume except on days where derivative contracts expire (see Hoffmann and Van Bommel (2010) ). Moreover, unlike Chi-X, the Primary Markets have a fixed set of rules that triggers an automatic call auction in times of extreme price movements (so-called volatility interruptions).
Data and preliminary analysis
Chi-X Ltd. generously provided us with a very detailed dataset for the months of April and May 2008, comprising a total of 43 trading days. The data contains information on the entire order traffic generated during this period, listing limit order 7 "Chi-X celebrates its first anniversary", Chi-X press release, 07. Reuters. Again, timestamps are rounded to the nearest millisecond. While the Chi-X data always contains a qualifier that tells us whether a market order was a buy or a sell, we sign trades on the Primary Markets using the Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm. As opposed to trades in a dealer market such as the NYSE, the risk of order misclassification is very small in a pure limit order book (trades are simply matched to the quotes prevailing prior to the transaction). Merging the BBO data from
Chi-X and the Primary Markets, we obtain the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO)
9
. We restrict our analysis to the continuous trading phase, which spans the time between 9:00 and 17:30 CET. Moreover, we remove hidden orders executed on Chi-X, as no such orders are admitted on the Primary Markets
10
.
At the time of our sample, Chi-X was the only existing MTF and only offered trading in blue chips, such that our analysis is limited to the constituents of the CAC40 and DAX30 indices. We drop three French stocks (Arcelor, EADS and Dexia) from our sample as they are simultaneously traded on other European markets (Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Brussels, respectively), such that our final sample comprises of 67 stocks.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] Table 1 in the appendix lists the stocks contained in our sample, while Table 2 contains summary statistics on the trading activity during our sample period. Overall, trading on Chi-X accounts on average for 5.95% of total trading volume, or 12.31% in terms of trades. Consequently, the average trade size on the Primary Markets 9 One potential concern is the fact that our data stem from two different sources, such that the timestamps are not fully synchronized. In order to mitigate potential concern with respect to this issue, we perform some sensitivity checks by lagging the Reuters time stamp (which should record the feeds from the primary markets with a small delay) between 0.1 and 0.5 seconds. We find that our results are insensitive to potentially asynchronous timestamps. 10 Hidden orders constitute less than 1% of all trades on Chi-X, such that their inclusion would not affect our analyses qualitatively.
(€28,990) is more than twice as large as the average transaction value on Chi-X (€12,620). This is in line with Chi-X being largely dominated by algorithmic traders, who have been shown to employ much smaller trade sizes than human traders (see e.g. Hendershott and Riordan [2009] ). Moreover, it is consistent with small orders being particularly cheap to execute on the MTF due to the Primary Markets' minimum fixed fees per order (see Section 3.1).
We also report the results for terciles based on stocks' average trading volume. Chi-X has a considerably larger market share (both in terms of trades and traded value) for the most active stocks, which is consistent with the evidence presented in Hengelbrock and Theissen [2009] for the Turquoise MTF.
Panel A of Table 3 contains statistics about the quality of Chi-X's quotes. The MTF is frequently present at the EBBO (around 49% for either bid or ask), and often even improves on the Primary Markets' quotes (ca. 26% for bid or ask). Nevertheless, the frequency with which the MTF is simultaneously present at both sides of the inside quote (alone) is considerably lower with approximately 24% (7%), indicating that the activity on Chi-X is often restricted to one side of the market. While the Primary
Markets are naturally present at the inside quote more often, they frequently face competition for at least one side of the market as they only spend roughly 26% of the time alone at the EBBO. Investigating the individual terciles, one can see that the MTF's quote competitiveness is somewhat higher for more active stocks, which is in line with the higher market shares in those stocks.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Panel B of Table 3 reports the average available market depth for each trading venue conditional on being present at the inside quote. Overall, the available depth in the Primary Markets is roughly three times the depth on Chi-X, which may in part explain the observed cross-market differences with respect to the average trade size.
Nevertheless, the MTFs displays considerable depth for its quotes.
Based on its presence at the best quotes, Chi-X's market share (in terms of trades or trading volume) seems strikingly low. This is consistent with the market access friction in our model, which forces captive traders to trade in the Primary Market irrespectively of the quotes prevailing elsewhere. In order to quantify this friction, we follow Foucault and Menkveld [2008] , who suggest estimating the proportion of smart routers () by the percentage of trades being executed on Chi-X conditional on the Primary Market offering a strictly worse quote. We additionally require that the depth on the MTF is sufficient to get the order filled entirely because it is natural to assume that traders take quantities into account when deciding where to route their orders. Given that Chi-X offers a considerably lower market depth on average, some agents may avoid splitting up their orders and therefore prefer the Primary Market.
This will particularly be the case if the marginally better price on the MTF is only available for a small fraction of the total order size.
The results in Table 4 (first column) strongly confirm the importance of imperfect order routing. Conditional on Chi-X offering a better quote with sufficient depth, every second order is still executed in the Primary Market, such that the proportion of smart routers is roughly 50%. Interestingly, the routing friction varies little across the different activity terciles, which is in contrast to the results in Foucault and Menkveld [2008] , who report a marked drop in smart order routing once moving beyond the most active stocks.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
An additional item of great interest is the tie-breaking rule assumed in the theoretical model of Section 2. Given the data at hand, we can actually compute an estimate of the tie-breaking rule, again following Foucault and Menkveld [2008] . In particular, the probability of a trade occurring on the Primary Market conditional on equal quotes across venues and sufficient depth on Chi-X to fill the order completely is equal to
where  is the proportion of smart routers and  denotes the parameter of the tiebreaking rule. This equation simply states that all captive traders plus a fraction  of the smart routers will trade on the Primary Market in the case of a tie, while the remaining agents trade on Chi-X. The last two columns of Table 4 contain the estimates for the proportion of trades executing in the Primary Market under an intermarket tie () and the tie-breaking rule () for the entire sample as well as the individual terciles. We find that our assumption regarding the tie-breaking rule in Section 2 is clearly confirmed, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that  is equal to zero, indicating that smart routers always choose to trade on Chi-X if it at least matches the quotes in the Primary Market. Given that Chi-X charges lower fees for market orders (except for very large orders), this result is not very surprising.
Estimating differences in informed trading
The implications of our model from Section 2 regarding market co-existence crucially depend on whether or not informed traders are more likely than noise traders to have access to the alternative trading platform (i.e. Chi-X). It is important to notice, that traders' routing abilities directly translate into the adverse selection risk faced by market makers and the price impact of trades. We can therefore filter out the relevant case for our setting by testing for differences in informed trading between Chi-X and the Primary Markets.
Effective spread decomposition
One of the most widely used measures for the assessment of trading costs is the percentage effective half-spread, which is defined as
where t p denotes the transaction price at time t, t m is the contemporaneously prevailing EBBO mid-quote, and t q is a trade direction indicator that takes the value of 1 for buys and -1 for sells. Compared to the quoted spread, this measure has the advantage that it measures trading costs only at the actual time of a trade, taking into account that liquidity demanders will attempt to time the market and trade when the bid-ask spread is relatively narrow.
Besides its simplicity, this measure has the additional advantage that it can be decomposed into an adverse selection (price impact) component
and an order processing component, usually termed realized half-spread
where t t m   is the mid-quote t  minutes after the transaction, the time at which the market maker is assumed to cover her position. While these measures constitute extreme simplifications of reality (e.g. trades between t and t+ t  are ignored), they have become a benchmark for assessing trading costs. Moreover, this spread decomposition also allows us to compare market maker revenues before transaction fees across markets through the realized spread.
For both markets, we calculate all three measures for each stock and trading day and then calculate averages across stock-days for the separate activity terciles. Given that even the least active stocks in our sample have a considerable trading volume, this procedure delivers relatively conservative standard errors. Moreover, trade-weighted statistics would bias the results in favour of Chi-X, as it has a larger market share in the most active stocks, which generally exhibit lower effective spreads. In all calculations, we exclude trades that occur when the market is locked or crossed, i.e.
when the EBBO spread is non-positive (see Shkilko et al. [2008] ). Nevertheless, including these observations does not alter the results qualitatively.
The results are listed in Table 5 . Overall, trading on Chi-X is not cheaper before fees:
Across all stocks and days, the effective spread on Chi-X averages 2.67 bps, compared to 2.64 bps in the Primary Market (Panel A). The difference of 0.03 bps is very small in economic terms (roughly 1%) and statistically insignificant. Given that Chi-X charges lower fees for market orders (except for very large trade sizes, see Section 3.1), the difference in effective spreads can be expected to be slightly negative net of fees. Exact calculations are not possible because participants in the Primary Markets may be granted rebates depending on their trading activity. Overall, the results suggest that trading on Chi-X is at most marginally cheaper than on the Primary Markets net of fees.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Nevertheless, a look at the spread decomposition 11 (Panels B and C) reveals important differences between both markets. Chi-X displays a significantly larger adverse selection component (2.68 bps compared to 2.27 bps), but markedly lower realized spreads (-0.01 bps vs. 0.37 bps). Importantly, the differences are both statistically and economically very significant. Liquidity providers on Chi-X are exposed to a much greater adverse selection risk, while their gross revenues are essentially equal to zero.
Net of transaction and clearing fees, market makers' revenues can be expected to be relatively similar across markets (notice that Chi-X grants a rebate of 0.2 bps for limit orders, while the Primary Markets charge a positive fee). Moreover, the fact that revenues from liquidity provision are very close to zero indicates a very competitive market.
Overall, the effective spread decomposition clearly suggests that liquidity providers on Chi-X face a higher adverse selection risk. This result appears very robust as it holds across all activity terciles, and we observe a higher price impact on Chi-X for all but 3 stocks 12 (these negative differences are not statistically different from zero).
Moreover, the realized spreads nicely illustrate that the liquidity rebate on the MTF helps market makers to sustain this excess risk.
In our model, cross-market differences in adverse selection risk arise because the proportion of informed traders differs between smart routers and captive traders.
While a higher price impact for orders executed on Chi-X indicates that smart routers are more likely than captive traders to be informed (
it also implies that we should observe a lower price impact for trade-throughs, as those stem exclusively from less informed captive traders (  CT   ). In order to verify this, we separate the Primary Market trades into trade-throughs and non-tradethroughs and calculate the effective spread decomposition for both types of transactions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results in Table 6 strongly confirm that trades violating inter-market price priority are more likely to stem from uninformed traders than transactions that occur while the Primary Market is at the inside quote. The estimated average price impact of a tradethrough is 0.91 bps, which is less than half of the 2.39 bps price impact of non-tradethroughs. Naturally, trade-throughs display a significantly larger effective spread (4.53 bps), as they leave money on the table by trading through a better available quote. Paired with the lower price impact, this boosts the realized spread (3.62 bps), which is pocketed by the market maker. Overall, these results indicate that the observed excess adverse selection risk on Chi-X is driven by the absence of mainly uninformed captive traders.
Hasbrouck's structural VAR
In a seminal contribution, Hasbrouck [1991] suggests a structural VAR model to estimate the permanent price impact of a trade. Since then, this measure has emerged as one of the most frequently employed procedures in the empirical market microstructure literature. The basic idea behind Hasbrouck's model is that there exists a dynamic linear relationship between price (quote) changes and trades, where current trades have an impact on current and future price changes, while current price changes can only trigger future trades. In our context, the model can be written as
where t r denotes log changes in the EBBO mid-quote and the x t k , k  P,C   are discrete variables that take the value of 1 for a buy, -1 for a sell, and 0 otherwise. As detailed by Hasbrouck [1991] [Insert Table 7 about here] Table 7 contains the permanent price impacts for both markets (impulse responses are truncated after 20 periods), where we again report stock-day averages for the entire sample and the activity terciles. The results are in line with those from the effective spread decomposition. On average, the permanent price impact of a trade on Chi-X amounts to 1.86 bps, compared to 1.61 bps for Primary Market trades. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. As in the previous section, we observe a higher price impact on Chi-X for each activity tercile, which underlines the robustness of our findings. For individual stocks, we find a higher price impact for Primary market trades in only 6 cases, and none of these differences are statistically significant 15 . Overall, these results provide further evidence for liquidity providers facing a higher adverse selection risk on Chi-X. 13 Estimating the model with data aggregated to 5-second intervals delivers qualitatively similar results but requires placing upper and lower bounds on a venue's price impact as the order flows are no longer uncorrelated. 14 The inclusion of additional lags does not alter our conclusions. 15 The results for individual stocks, which we do not report for brevity, are available upon request.
In order to check whether the difference in adverse selection across markets is indeed due to captive traders being mainly uninformed, we modify the VAR from equations (5) - (7) and split the Primary Market order flow into trade-throughs and non-tradethroughs. This results in the following VAR system
where x [Insert Table 8 about here]
Differences in adverse selection and Chi-X's quote competitiveness
The results of the previous section suggest that trades on Chi-X carry more private information than those executing place in the Primary Markets. In order to validate our model empirically, we adopt a cross-sectional perspective.
According to Corollary 1, Chi-X's presence at the inside quote is expected to decrease (weakly) in the adverse selection risk differential. As the empirical evidence suggests that the adverse selection risk differential is positive for almost all stocks, we actually expect to observe a strictly negative relationship.
We begin by calculating, for each stock, the fraction of time during which Chi-X is present at the EBBO, taking the average of both sides of the market 16 . We then regress this measure of Chi-X's quote competitiveness on measures that capture the difference in adverse selection across trading venues and additional control variables,
i.e. we estimate the cross-sectional regression
where 1 
23
[Insert Table 9 about here]
We include a number of control variables that we expect to influence Chi-X's presence at the best quote.
While we have not incorporated the effect of tick sizes in our model for tractability reasons, it is known that a discrete pricing grid leads to rounding errors and therefore artificially inflates the bid-ask spread (see e.g. Harris [1994] ). As a consequence, we expect Chi-X's quote competitiveness to increase in the tick size differential 17 , which we define as the average 18 difference in tick sizes (Primary market minus Chi-X) for stock i scaled by the stock's average transaction price. We furthermore include the proportion of smart routers as a control variable in order to disentangle our story from that of Foucault and Menkveld (2008) . Additionally, we also control for the log of shown to be particularly quick in reacting to "hard" information (Jovanovic and Menkveld [2010] ).
[Insert Table 10 about here]
The coefficient estimates are listed in Table 10 in the Appendix. As predicted by our model, the results indicate that an increase in the adverse selection risk differential is associated with Chi-X being less frequently at the inside quote. The coefficients on 17 For some stocks, the difference in tick sizes is considerable. For example, during most of the sample, the tick size for Infineon is €0.01 on Xetra, compared to €0.001 on Chi-X. Given the stock's low price level (below €10), the bid-ask spread on the Primary Market is frequently equal to the tick size. Consequently, Chi-X is particularly attractive for trading in this stock as it allows the placement of orders within the primary quotes. A few days before the end of the sample period, Deutsche Börse reduced the tick size to €0.005. 18 A total of 9 stocks experience a change in tick sizes during our sample period, all of them corresponding to a reduction in the Primary Market tick size. One stock (STMicroelectronics) experiences two changes. at the best quote to increase by 7-11%, depending on the specification. Different from Menkveld and Foucault [2008] , we find that the proportion of smart routers is not significantly related to Chi-X's quote competitiveness. This is likely due to the fact that exchanges do not charge any fees for order submission, which is an important feature of their model and data. For the other control variables, we find that both higher trading volume and higher return synchronicity are associated with Chi-X being at the inside quote more frequently. Finally, there is some weak evidence for Chi-X offering worse quotes in stocks listed on Euronext. This may be due to the staggered entry of the MTF across countries. While Chi-X entered the German market roughly one year before the start of our sample period, it did not offer trading in
French stocks until half a year later.
While our theoretical model is strictly speaking about quotes, it has very similar implications regarding Chi-X's actual market share. Given a fixed number of trading rounds, a higher excess adverse selection risk leads to less trade on Chi-X after controlling for the proportion of smart routers. We therefore re-estimate equation (12), but replace Chi-X's presence at the best quote with the MTF's market share in terms of trades. The results (Table 11) are very similar than the results for quotes. All variables capturing the adverse selection risk differential are negative and statistically significant. Again, the economic effects are substantial. For example, a one standard deviation increase in AS i SD is associated with an increase of 1.10% in Chi-X's market share. Unsurprisingly, the explanatory effect of the proportion of smart routers is strongly significant. The coefficients on the remaining control variables are, by and large, similar to the results using Chi-X's presence at the inside quote.
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[Insert Table 11 about here] Overall, the cross-sectional evidence suggests that Chi-X's competitiveness is significantly hampered by excess adverse selection risk. These findings strongly support our theoretical model.
Conclusion
Motivated by the current regulatory framework in Europe set forth under MiFID, we analyze how market access frictions give rise to differences in adverse selection risks across markets in the absence of inter-market price priority. We argue that liquidity providers on alternative trading platforms will be subject to an increased adverse selection risk if informed traders are more likely to have access to this market via a smart order routing system. Consequently, the Primary Market will dominate (display better quotes) most of the trading day despite charging higher transaction fees. We formalize this argument with an extension of the Glosten and Milgrom [1985] sequential trade model.
The analysis of a recent sample of transactions and quote data for German and French stocks reveals that liquidity providers on Chi-X (a recently launched trading platform) face a significantly greater adverse selection risk. Moreover, trade-throughs that execute "by default" in the Primary Markets are particularly uninformed. In line with our theoretical model, we find a negative relationship between the excess adverse selection risk and Chi-X's presence at the inside quote. Moreover, our view is additionally supported by anecdotal evidence from Primary Market outages.
Our findings have some implications for the design of best execution policies.
Allowing for trade-throughs favors the Primary Markets by ensuring that the least informative order flow does not reach the MTFs, thereby hampering liquidity provision on these platforms due to an increased adverse selection risk. Our findings suggest that protecting orders from trade-throughs in the spirit of RegNMS may foster competition between trading venues as it helps to level the playing field.
There are some interesting avenues for future research. In our theoretical analysis, we have taken exchanges' transaction fees and investors' routing technologies as given.
This choice follows from noise traders' willingness to trade at any price and the assumption that agents do not have the chance to trade multiple times. Clearly, a more realistic model would aim to determine these variables endogenously.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Before we state the proof of Proposition 1, it is useful to introduce some additional notation.
As trader populations differ across markets, so does the function that maps market makers (henceforth MMs) prior into their posterior beliefs. Let  t sell t , t1   denote the posterior belief about the probability of a high realization of the liquidation value after a sell by the t-th trader, given the prior  t1 . Then, using Bayes' rule,
From this follows that the expected liquidation value of the asset conditional on the arrival of a sell order is given by
, where equality applies to the limiting cases of  t1  0 and  t1  1.
We are now ready to state the proof of Proposition 1. For notational simplicity, we omit the time subscripts on MMs beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part Q.E.D. we replace the independent variable by Chi-X's market share in terms of trades. All variables are described in Section 5. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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